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Most European countries are affected by high unemployment rates. Among the OECD 
countries, the performance of the Spanish labour market is among the worst as far as 
employment activity is concerned, with unemployment rates during the 1990s having 
reached levels far exceeding 20%. Accordingly, employment creation has been one of 
the primary challenges facing the Spanish government since 1980. 
 
We follow the approached used by the OECD, by which a division into passive and 
active policies is established, which is used by a significant1 number of scholars. 
While passive policies are those which act as a buffer against unemployment, active 
policies are geared towards solving the labour-related problems from their roots, so to 
speak. 
 
The present report is organised as follows. First, we will introduce the nature of the 
unemployment problem in Spain and explore its main causes. In Section II, we go on 
to survey the current state of the Spanish labour market, dividing the labour reforms 
into passive and active policies. Upon discussing passive policies, we will analyse in 
some detail the reform of May 2002, which has provoked a general strike in Spain. 
Section III provides the historical context and identifies the paradigms at work, laying 
particular emphasis on the Reforms of 1994 and 1997, as well as the different reforms 
carried out on part-time work. We will also discuss there what constitutes in our 
opinion two of the most important features of the Spanish labour market: the issues of 
segmentation and collective bargaining in Spain. This discussion could serve as a 
                                                 
1 This classification is to some extent ambiguous: thus, the European Commission has repeatedly 
included the competition policy inside the agenda of active policies aimed at promoting employment. 
The reform of the education system undertaken within the period we are to analyse, or the importance 
of the high accidental rate in Spain constitute on the contrary issues of crucial importance when it 
comes to studying the market labour performance and its consequences in terms of welfare. Even 
though these latter issues will most likely be analysed within the WRAMSOC project, we will follow 
in the sequel a minimalist approach throughout this study. 
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basis for stimulating future research on the idiosyncratic features of the Spanish 
labour market2.  
 
 
Some Possible Causes of Spanish Unemployment 
 
Examining the potential causes of unemployment is essential for understanding the 
scope and the drawbacks of the reforms undertaken in Spain. Account must be taken 
of the fact that there is no general consensus on the main causal channels at work. 
Since there are countless studies that attempt to tackle this issue, we feel obliged to be 
selective. Lack of flexibility was among the major causes which policymakers by and 
large agreed to exert an upward pressure on labour costs back in the 1980s. Since 
wage labour costs are not especially high in Spain, we shall concentrate on non-wage 
labour costs and shall omit from this section all the analysis focusing on the lack of 
wage moderation in the Spanish labour market. Neither will we consider the 
explanations based on technological change, as they depend on the very nature of the 
change, and no salient conclusion has thus far been achieved as to the impact of 
technological change on employment. 
 
As far as non-wage labour costs are concerned, high hiring and firing costs could 
potentially be a cause of unemployment since they deter firms from hiring new 
workers in the face of economic growth. This may help explain the low elasticity of 
employment with respect to economic growth displayed in Spain during the 1990s. 
 
Other strand of the literature lays stress on the negotiation process where core workers 
exert upward wage pressure, which in turn leads firms to make job conditions of 
outsiders more precarious in order to make up for the high insider wage-costs. Not 
only does this process help to explain the high unemployment rate, as noted by 
Bentolila and Dolado (1994), but it is also responsible for the segmentation of the 
Spanish labour market, since firms often make up for the high insiders’ wages by 
cutting outsider’s wages down. 
 
In the economic literature, a labour market is said to exhibit hysteresis whenever 
temporary shocks (especially adverse historical events) appear to have permanent 
effects on employment or earnings. Traditionally, two plausible types of propagation 
mechanisms have been discussed for assessing the possible explanation of hysteresis: 
the insider-outsider effects described above, and the human capital erosion, mostly 
affecting long-term unemployed and which, as we have just noted, might be related to 
the bargaining power of core workers3. Orthodox economic theory, both theoretical 
and empirical, has hitherto ignored the interplay between these two causal channels: 
the two probably reinforce each other, so that the impact of the insider-outsider 
channel, proven to be more relevant than the human capital explanation, might be 
underestimated in the empirical research. The phenomenon of hysteresis in Spain has 
been unanimously traced back by scholars to the oil crisis of 1974, when inflationary 
                                                 
2 This report must be complemented with the education reform taken place in Spain during the 1990s 
and earlier 2002. As pointed out before, we will not touch upon this issue but in the future for lack of 
space. 
3 Which is related to the position of unions in the framework of industrial relations.   
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pressures led central banks to sacrifice short-term employment for the sake of price 
stability.  
 
 
The Labour Market in Spain: Active and Passive Policies 
 
As reported in the OECD Employment Outlook, the distribution of public expenditure 
on employment policy in Spain over the period 1991-2000 shows that it is markedly 
biased towards passive policies. Active policies currently account for around 1% of 
GDP, while in 1991 it was 0.76%. Despite this improvement, countries such as 
Germany (1.23% of GDP allocated to active policies), the Netherlands (1.57%) or 
France (1.46%) performs more active-oriented policies than Spain. The high level of 
provides a simple explanation for this phenomenon. Also of significance is the low 
proportion of workers affected by active measures compared to other OECD countries 
and the increasing weight of active policies with respect to passive policies in the 
government budget. This trend is starting to reverse: while in 1993 passive policies 
represented 87.1% of total expenditure, as of 2000, they represented 57.6%4. 
 
The Spanish government has nonetheless shown a great concern with fostering 
employment through active policies. As a matter of fact, the GDP elasticity of 
employment has increased in Spain (Toharia, 1997), even though the segmentation 
experienced by the labour market has greatly limited this achievement. 
 
Passive Policies 
Passive policies5 in Spain are divided, according to the Basic Law of Employment 
(LBE, 1980), into two categories: insurance benefits and assistance benefits. The 
former entitles the worker to a benefit computed on the basis of the time and the level 
of contribution while the latter are a complement of insurance benefits provided the 
worker has accomplished a minimum time of contribution. The details are reflected in 
the table below (Toharia, 1997).  
                                                 
4 Source, OECD Employment Survey: www.oecd.org  
5 The agricultural sector deserves itself another section. Agricultural workers benefit a special scheme 
(PER) whose description is for the moment beyond the scope of this report.  
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Assistance 
Benefit 
 
With 
family responsibility 
Without 
Family responsibility 
Months of 
Contribution 
(C) 
 
 
Insurance 
Benefit 
Under 45 Over 45 Under 45 Over 45 
3  3 3   
4  4 4   
5  5 5   
6-11  21 21 6 6 
12-17 4 18 24   
18-35 [2C/6] (6-10)6 24 30   
36-71 [2C/6] (12-22) 24 30  6 
72 24  36  12 
Older 52  Until retirement 
Others  18 
 
 
A Comment on the Reform of 2002 
As a result of an upward trend in the coverage rates during the period 1998-2001, the 
Decree Law (RDL 5/2002) was passed in May 2002. An unemployed worker is, under 
the new rule, obliged to accept any job offer whose workplace is within a distance of 
50 kilometres (rather than 30 km., as prescribed previously) from the worker’s 
address, unless the worker must spend 20% of his wage earnings in transport costs, or 
it takes him two hours to get to the workplace. At the same time, the state commits 
itself to promoting geographical mobility to compensate this regulation. Besides, an 
important measure has been introduced with a view to cutting wage labour costs down 
at the aggregate level, which consists in abolishing the salario de tramitación (back 
pay awarded after dismissal appeal hearings) in the case of unfair dismissal if the 
worker is reinstated. The first 60 days of the ‘salario de tramitación’ was previously 
paid by the firm according to art. 56 of the Workers’ Statute (LET). This measure 
aims at reducing the budgetary burden of Social Security, since it reduces the period 
of contribution of the worker, as well as incentiving workers to put more effort into 
their job search. The Spanish government claims that this reform will make firms 
increase the number of fixed-term contracts. The category of permanent intermittent, 
with 180,000 workers laying into it, was abolished in the reform of 1994 and rescued 
again in the Reform of 1997. The RDL 5/2002 distinguishes, in line with the reform 
of 2001, permanent intermittent workers who are certain of the job period and those 
who do not (‘llamada cierta’ and ‘llamada incierta’, respectively). The 2002 reform 
plans to abolish employment insurance to those workers belonging to the former 
category. Even though the decree foresees further regulation to determine the 
intermittent  permanent worker, a certain degree of social unrest has generated among 
this minority group, as well as on other disadvantageous groups such as immigrants or 
those over 52 who have ever benefited from a severance payment over 4639 euros, 
since the decree hinders this group pre-retirement. 
 
                                                 
6 This figure and the one below are reduced to the minimum integer less than or equal to 2C/6. The 
former lies between 6 and 10, while the latter ranges from 12 to 22. 
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The only exception to this rule is that it promotes hiring women, as it implies a full 
discount of the social security costs to hiring women who go back to work within the 
first 24 month after the childbirth no matter whether the contract is full- or part-time. 
Under the Law 12/2001 the contract had to be permanent, so as to encourage 
employers to use this type of contracts. Probably this reform has been undergone as 
the government did not perceive a change in the after the Law 12/2001 came into 
effect, notwithstanding it seems that the reaction to a reform like this the reaction 
period could take longer. In our opinion, the unions’ claim that this may promote 
temporary contracts among young women is well founded. 
 
The unions UGT and CC.OO summoned a general strike on 20 June against this 
reform, which seemingly has been successful, despite the contradictory statements of 
the social partners make it difficult to evaluate its impact objectively. It remains to 
explore the real effects of such measures, though; and whether the savings they 
convey to the government will be allocated to foster active measures. As far as we 
know there has been no such statement on the part of the Spanish government as of 
today. Although the most evident reforms concern the procedure to benefit 
unemployment benefits, there is a measure deserving a special mention: a dismissal 
becomes now effective before the courts find it fair: seemingly, the government is 
more worried about cutting down firms’ costs than to tackle seriously the 
segmentation of the labour market. 
 
Active Policies 
Following the OECD classification, active labour measures include labour market 
training, subsidies to foster employment, measures in favour of disadvantaged social 
groups and the efforts aimed at improving the public employment services.  
 
Labour Market Training 
Labour market training are financed by the European Social Fund, since 1986, and 
also by the vocational training levy, whereby firms are due to pay 0.7% of payroll. 
The main policy for labour market training has been through the Plan FIP set up in 
1985 with a view to planning vocational training expenditures together with the EU 
and managed by the INEM7. With the reform of 1993, training of employed workers 
was transferred to a private foundation (FORCEM), which was managed by the social 
partners. The rate of integration in the labour market among students trained under the 
Plan FIP is almost 75%, though only 2% gained a full-time contract. 
 
Vocational training was reorganised in the period 1993-1996 to increase the quality of 
training, as well as to bring it closer to firms’ needs. The National List of Professional 
Certificates aims at providing information on skills awarded within the different 
sectors of vocational training in order to foster mobility among the workforce. 
 
At a local level, the Workshop Schools and Trade Houses (‘Programas de Escuelas-
Taller y Casas de Oficio’) started in 1985 so as to address youth unemployment 
among school dropouts. The real boost of the programme came in 1988, when it 
allowed the number of students to triple from 1987 reaching 30,000 students. On 
                                                 
7 It stands for National Institute for Employment. It underwent a process of decentralisation started in 
the earlier nineties.  
 6
average, the number of students enrolled on this program has been relatively steady, 
near 40,000, from early 1990. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that the share of employed trainees has barely reached the one 
per cent ever since 1988. Moreover, while the INEM manages the training 
programmes, they are mostly carried out by private firms.  
Employment Promotion by Contract Design 
The government has created various types of contracts to facilitate hiring and to 
improve employment conditions (see next Section below). Following Toharia’s 
taxonomy (Toharia, 1997), these contracts can be classified according to whether they 
are endowed or not with direct or indirect incentives (for instance, when it allows 
firms to evade the ‘regulatory framework for usual contracts’). These contracts will be 
explained in some detail in next Section. 
 
Other Activation Measures  
The following programmes are to be considered as well as active policies. 
1. Improving information systems. 
These measures aimed at articulating the labour market, and avoiding existing 
mismatching between supply and demand. They consist of networks, which in the 
case of job clubs, set out for the first time in England, are co-ordinated by a 
monitor. 
 
2. Capitalisation of unemployment benefits. 
It consists of a payment in advance of the full unemployment benefit to set up 
businesses. Since 1992, this programme included self-employed and cooperatives 
and worker-limited firms8. Since 1992, the former, apart from the handicapped, 
were excluded from the programme. These projects are exempted of social 
security contributions. The RDL 5-2002 has limited the payment to the amount of 
the legal contribution (‘aportación social’). The rest can be acquired on a quarterly 
basis to pay the workers’ social security benefits. 
 
3. Promotion of employment in firms. 
It aims at providing financial assistance to workers’ limited companies (SALs) 
and cooperatives. It includes services such as technical assistance, and 
management training. 
   
4. Promotion of self-employment. 
This programme is geared toward auditing and advising services as well as access 
to soft credit. The number of participants is modest, around 10-15 thousand per 
year. 
 
5. Fiscal policies and investment incentives at a regional level. 
Carried out by several regional governments in order to stimulate investment. 
Thus, the governments of the Basque Country and Navarre, under the auspices of 
historical rights, and Catalonia have implemented incentive measures including 
tax exemptions on firms to foster capital inflow in their respective headquarters. 
                                                 
8 Sociedades Anónimas Laborales 
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The fiscal differences between regions with historical rights (the Basque Country 
and Navarre) and the neighbouring regions Aragón and La Rioja ranges between 
0.8 and 32%. These differences constitute a source of conflict, which have led the 
governments of La Rioja to answer back with similar measures. Other 
programmes have been spread in Andalusia, Castille-Leon. The government of 
Aragon has launched a programme (EXPORTA) to foster exports of SMEs with a 
view to making up for the comparative drawback of the historical-rights 
neighbouring regions. It includes commercial and technological  advice and 
translation services, as well as access to an internet. Of remarkable interest is also 
the agreement between the Basque Government and the Mondragón Cooperative 
Corporation to create 8,000 jobs by 2000. The agreement dealt with training, risks 
at labour, consolidation of temporary contracts and market co-ordination among 
other measures. 
 
6. Promotion of local employment initiatives. 
This programme, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Labour and local governments, 
seeks to promote entrepreneurial spirit among under 25s, or over 25s who have 
ever happened to be long-term unemployed. It includes incentives to hire workers 
on a permanent basis and soft-credit and management assistantship. Since there is 
no published information it is impossible to assess the impact of this programme 
on the economic activity in the short-term (Toharia, 1997). 
 
7. Labour integration for the handicapped. 
The various reforms have implemented fiscal incentives to hire disabled people. 
Also, grants are provided to disabled people wishing to set up their own business. 
 
  
The Changing Legal Framework in the period 1985-2002 
 
From the Workers’ Statute to 1994 
As discussed above, employment creation is one of the major issues that has 
confronted Spanish governments since 1980. This goal has been combined with the 
parallel aim of bringing about a degree of labour market harmonisation with the rest 
of its EU partners. 
 
Labour market flexibility became part of the orthodox paradigm adopted by 
international organisations as well as the European Commission. The industrial 
relations scheme envisaged under the 1978 Constitution and the 1980 Workers’ 
Statute (LET) became the target of reform before these norms had taken root. Thus, in 
1984 the tripartite Economic and Social Agreement (AES) introduced a wide range of 
measures for temporary employment, which are probably responsible for the good 
record of labour creation that came about between 1984 and 1991. These measures 
amended the LET and included fixed-term contracts free of hiring costs and 
temporary contracts which until then were confined to unemployed and to workers 
under 25 years old. As the protection of permanent workers remained essentially 
unchanged this deregulation has brought about labour market segmentation: 
temporary employment, being mostly involuntary, make the causality principle 
inherent in the hiring process break down. Aside from damaging the most 
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disadvantaged social groups, this process of labour market segmentation may well 
have produced adverse effects for at least two reasons: 
1. It may result in a shift from taxes into labour costs through a reduction in labour 
productivity, which may have increased the cost of disinflationary policy imposed 
by the EMU in terms of employment. 
2. It may produce worker detachment which in turn may have detrimental effects on 
training and on the formation of human capital (Jimeno and Toharia, 1992). 
Besides, as some workers stand low chance to be kept in the firm (the turnover 
rate stands high), little effort is put into job and productivity may end up 
lowering. 
 
According to Farrel (2001), following the LET reform policy lacked resolution for ten 
years, due to principally three reasons, (a) the process of industrial restructuring that 
took place during the 1980s (b) reasonably healthy employment creation levels and 
(c) the high degree of interventionism inherent in the LET and the Spanish 
Constitution.  During this period the government tried to incorporate youths into the 
labour market by introducing insertion contracts. The UGT and CC.OO trade unions 
called for a general strike on 14 December 1988 and managed to abolish these types 
of contracts, on the basis that it would not help to counter labour market 
segmentation. 
 
In 1992 passive policies amounted to 84.5% of the budget allocated to employment 
policies. The Law 22/1992, which was passed on 4 August, implemented a reduction 
of employment benefits and provides incentives for the unemployed to put more effort 
into the job search process. The subsequent Decree Law 5/2002 appearing in Section 
II resembles in spirit the earlier policy. Given that two years later the balance between 
active and passive policies remained essentially unchanged no substitution between 
the two occurred after the law came into effect9.  
 
The Reform of 1994 
During the period 1992-1994 years real wages and unit labour costs had been falling 
(see Appendix). At the same time unions also started to lose their social 
representativeness. Nonetheless, the unemployment rate did not experience a 
noticeable reduction. By 1994 one third of the Spanish workforce was hired under 
temporary contracts, one of the highest levels in the EU. In contrast part-time 
employment increased slowly and at 7% amounted to half of the EU average. There 
was a pressing need for combining flexibility and security in Spain, where 32.5% of 
total employment was on a fixed-term basis, and more than 90% of all new contracts 
were temporary. This situation brought about a high turnover rate. The main dilemma 
confronting policymakers from 1985 onwards was how to substitute flexibility and 
security for rigidity and vulnerability in the labour market. 
 
Furthermore, in 1992 and 1993, a good part of the employment created during the 
preceding years was destroyed. The PSOE government recognised the urgent need for 
                                                 
9 There seems to be no technical reason for such a delay, since no lag is likely to occur from the 
moment when the law comes into effect and the budgetary effects. Moreover, in this period, there 
continued to be few beneficiaries of active policies as compared with other Member States.  
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further actions to resolve these problems and set out to increase the flexibility of the 
labour market. The basic elements and objectives of this reform are the following: 
1. Fostering part-time contracts and lowering the high rate of temporality, which in 
practical terms (Cachón and Palacio, 1997), meant a rupture of the causality 
principle in the hiring process. 
2. Introduction of private employment agencies, which entailed a process of 
decentralisation given the de facto monopoly of employment services by the 
National Employment Institute (INEM). The main goal of these reforms was to 
improve existing information systems to better co-ordinate labour demand and 
supply. 
3. One of the central goals of the reform was to strengthen collective bargaining at a 
decentralised level. According to some authors this was subsequently improved 
by the reform of 1997. 
 
Also of noteworthy effect training contracts were substituted by apprenticeship 
contracts and temporary contracts were abolished, so that the causality principle did 
not apply contrary to what the reform invoked. Furthermore, the increase of part-time 
contracts took place at the expense of intermittent permanent jobs10. The UGT and 
CC.OO complained that these measures would not bring about the desired reduction 
of the temporary rate, and that the introduction of learning contracts would lead to 
greater precarious employment among young workers. Unfortunately, many of the 
unions’ prophecies were fulfilled: the contracts that were abolished were simply 
replaced by equally precarious contracts, such as the apprenticeship contract itself, 
resulting in no marked effect on the temporary rate. At any rate, the unemployment 
rate dropped after the second quarter of 1994 which could be partly due to the reform. 
 
As for collective bargaining the main issues concerned the autonomy in terms of 
wage, working day and mobility-related questions. The limitations of the reform 
stemmed from the inability of the social partners to come to agreement on the subject 
of dismissal costs and the ambiguity inherent in the concept of objective causes of 
dismissal. We shall come back to this issue when dealing with the 1997-reform below. 
 
The Reform of 1997: the April Agreements 
In April 1997, the social partners from the outset showed a noticeable display of 
unity, in contrast with the previous 1994 reform passed under the socialist 
government, and agreed on a major labour reform. The April agreements consisted of 
three main goals, namely reducing the instability of the labour market, promoting 
collective bargaining and plugging the void in sectoral regulation due to the abolition 
of labour ordinances. 
 
With a view to promoting stable employment contracts, the government passed two 
decree laws (RDL 8/1997 and RDL 9/1997), ratified on 5 June 1997. The starting 
point for this reform was an unemployment rate of 21.49% at the beginning of 1997, 
and a high level of insecure employment. By abolishing the temporary contract for 
employment promotion the socialist government had unsuccessfully attempted to 
                                                 
10 The RDL 5/2002 hinders the unemployment benefits payments to intermittent permanent workers. 
See the 2nd section for more details. 
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reduce the temporary rate: at 34% it was still three times higher than the EU average 
while the new permanent contracts only represented 4% of total hiring. 
 
Dismissal costs had long been regarded as one of the major hurdles inhibiting firms 
from adjusting employment in response to economic prosperity. Being aware of this 
the government introduced a new sort of contract (‘contrato para el fomento de la 
contratación indefinida’, CFCI) with low firing costs. It would be implemented for a 
period of four years with a subsequent evaluation process to decide whether to adopt 
it, abolish it or reform it. The CFCI applies to young workers (under 30), long-term 
unemployed (over 12 months) and over-45 unemployed. Under certain conditions, 
this contract could be used to turn a temporary contract into a permanent one. The 
firing costs inherent in the CFCI differ from those of the ordinary permanent contract 
only in the case of unfair dismissal for objective reasons. With the previous contracts, 
fired workers were entitled to a 33-day pay for every year worked with a two-year 
salary ceiling, compared to a 45-day pay and a ceiling of four-year. An unfair 
collective or individual dismissal for objective reasons continued to involve a lower 
compensation of 20-day pay per year with a one-year ceiling. These measures were 
complemented with a two-year cut of 40%-80% in the social security contributions of 
employers in case of common contingencies associated to the CFCI11. 
 
The April agreements also attempted to improve industrial relations, which had been 
characterised by a worrying lack of structure, a situation that could be traced back to 
the Franco regime. It was based on provincial agreements, mostly sectoral, coexisting 
with other sort of agreements whether state- or firm-wide. The agreement sought to 
distribute functions among the different negotiating areas according to their area of 
specialisation. The social partners are committed to speed up the bargaining process. 
 
 
The Part-Time Reform (1998 and 2001) 
Since 1984 employers were dissuaded from signing part-time contracts and part-time 
workers in Spain were essentially subject to the same rules, pro rata, as full-time 
workers. For the most part these workers ended up with temporary contracts. The 
policy dilemma was how to address the trade-off between the quantity and quality of 
part-time work, the search of new combinations of flexibility and security. The 
Labour Reform introduced in 1994 increased labour market flexibility in response to 
the new demands for greater competitiveness arising from globalisation, economic 
restructuring and the single market. This reform lifted important restrictions on part-
time work concerning maximum daily and weekly hours and the absolute ceiling of 
two-thirds of standard full-time hours. 
 
The Spanish National Action Plans for employment of 1998 and 1999 included the 
options suggested by the 16 and 17 EES Guidelines, which focused on a greater 
degree of flexibility. Since 1998 regional governments have been developing their 
employment plans and have implemented measures to facilitate the reorganisation of 
working time. These measures include arrangements for working-time flexibility 
agreed at the regional level through social dialogue, subsidy programs. 
                                                 
11 The firm would benefit permanently of this cut if the employee is over 45 years old.  
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At the national level the government and the main trade unions signed the Agreement 
on Promoting Stable Part-time Employment on 13 November 1998 displaying yet 
again a notable willingness to dialogue. This agreement laid down regulations to 
promote stable part-time employment, permanent intermittent  employment and 
replacement contracts combined with early retirement. It sought to combine flexibility 
with protection of part-time workers, the voluntary election of part-timers, and the 
equal treatment in relation with full-time. Still, the Confederation of Employers 
(CEOE) did not sign it, a fact that helps explain why part-time figures have remained 
stagnant since 1995, around 8 % on average. 
 
The Labour Reform of 2001 again substantially modified the regulation of part-time 
employment contracts. The PP government that signed the 1998 Agreement changed 
important criteria, in a new attempt to promote part-time jobs. These changes were in 
line with employers’ preferences, such as the suppression of the ceiling for number of 
part-time hours, established at 77% of a standard full-time employment contract, and 
a more flexible distribution of working hours groups. On this occasion the unions 
together with the left-wing political parties strongly opposed the reform. According to 
these groups the new changes would deteriorate the employment conditions of the 
disadvantageous social groups rather than supporting non-discriminating forms of 
stable part-time contracts. No doubt this continues to be a contentious issue on the 
political agenda. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is perhaps too early to assess the effects of the labour reforms on the Spanish labour 
market. The 2001 and 2002 reforms certainly will not help to fight against either 
segmentation (subemployment) or unemployment, unless a replacement of passive 
with active policies is achieved. Thus far, the government has not given any credible 
signal that this will be the case. 
 
On the other hand the countless reforms adopted during the last years make it difficult 
to evaluate the appropriateness of certain laws and it is expected that firms will delay 
their hiring decisions until a more stable legal framework is set up. At the same time 
the Spanish government seems to be eager to implement new reforms in a context 
where employers are slow to respond to legal innovations. 
 
More comparative analysis is required on the degree of labour market flexibility; 
whereas a notable institutional convergence is apparent this is not yet reflected by a 
convergence of economic indicators such as unemployment rates. This means that we 
must point to other idiosyncratic aspects of Spanish labour market for explaining its 
poor performance, such as the low degree of human capital formation as compared 
with other OECD members, or even historical factors as put forth in the second  
section. 
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Appendix12 
 
Table 5.2: Index wage rates (1976-2000) in the WRAMSOC countries 
 
 
Country 
Year 
Spain Finland Germany United 
Kingdom
Sweden Switz. France 
1976 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
1977 101.843 96.701 103.405 96.207 98.455 101.100 102.018
1978 105.305 95.307 106.056 100.027 95.659 104.406 104.977
1979 107.684 98.657 107.546 101.796 96.032 104.008 106.008
1980 104.793 100.344 108.330 105.589 96.223 105.741 107.463
1981 108.585 102.565 106.924 106.546 92.736 106.605 108.293
1982 108.171 103.752 105.824 107.157 89.413 108.024 109.479
1983 110.957 106.196 105.857 110.613 86.386 109.396 108.794
1984 109.545 109.528 106.396 112.217 87.466 109.458 108.441
1985 111.265 113.231 107.617 115.618 88.279 110.108 107.680
1986 110.305 118.013 112.112 120.906 91.594 113.061 109.210
1987 107.434 123.169 115.097 123.796 93.837 114.570 109.260
1988 107.668 127.520 116.958 126.878 94.558 116.399 110.665
1989 107.991 132.762 117.035 131.528 97.526 145.937 110.768
1990 110.741 135.585 118.940 134.710 98.983 146.778 112.288
1991 114.819 135.681 103.125 135.868 94.199 149.018 113.371
1992 118.737 133.086 109.074 136.451 97.340 152.285 114.314
1993 120.914 128.337 109.618 136.269 95.781 149.722 114.351
1994 120.806 129.328 108.968 137.336 98.212 150.396 113.739
1995 120.142 134.241 110.378 136.999 98.640 150.610 114.148
1996 120.209 137.184 110.120 136.880 103.175 128.110 114.664
1997 119.570 138.409 108.241 139.752 105.829 130.074 115.493
1998 120.262 141.668 108.133 142.378 110.199 130.648 117.289
1999 120.652 143.201 109.266 146.982 112.478 132.075 119.611
2000 121.581 144.951 109.426 151.441 116.398 132.261 120.961
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics. 
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Table 5.2.1: Average rate of growth within five-year periods among WRAMSOC 
countries 
 
 
Country 
Year 
Spain Finland Germany United 
Kingdom
Sweden Switz France 
1980-85 1.20 2.42 -0.13 1.81 -1.72 0.81 0.04
1985-90 -0.09 3.60 2.00 3.06 2.29 5.75 0.84
1990-95 1.63 -0.20 -1.49 0.34 -0.07 0.52  0.33
1995-00 0.24 1.54 -0.17 2.00 3.31 -2.60 1.16
 
Source: Administrative data provided by OECD, Labour Market Statistics. 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Unemployment rates (Standardised) 
 
 
Country 
Year 
Spain Finland Germany United 
Kingdom
Sweden Switz. France 
1984 20.20 5.93 7.10 11.15 3.27  9.71
1985 21.60 6.05 7.17 11.50 2.89  10.14
1986 21.30 6.66 6.53 11.53 2.67  10.28
1987 20.60 4.90 6.33 10.60 2.20  10.45
1988 19.50 4.22 6.22 8.72 1.80  9.93
1989 17.20 3.13 5.60 7.27 1.55  9.39
1990 16.20 3.16 4.77 7.05 1.73  8.99
1991 16.40 6.65 4.16 8.82 3.12 1.95 9.48
1992 18.40 11.59 6.59 10.02 5.57 3.06 10.41
1993 22.70 16.40 7.90 10.46 9.04 3.98 11.73
1994 24.10 16.72 8.41 9.58 9.36 3.84 12.28
1995 22.90 15.23 8.19 8.73 8.81 3.46 11.68
1996 22.20 14.55 8.90 8.17 9.58 3.90 12.34
1997 20.80 12.63 9.87 7.04 9.90 4.19 12.30
1998 18.80 11.36 9.31 6.34 8.34 3.52 11.80
1999 15.90 10.17 8.60 6.08 7.18 3.02 11.17
2000 14.10 9.72 7.91 5.54 5.91  9.50
 
Source: Administrative data provided by OECD, Labour Market Statistics. 
